Description: The author examines in detail the campaign waged by the British in the North African Desert: first against the Italians, and then against the combined forces of the Germans and the Italians, of which Rommel was the actual, if not (for much of the time) the official commander. The author attempts to restore balance to the judgement of General Ritchie’s performance, which he believes has been unjustly critical. The period 27 May – 25 June 1942 is dealt with in particular detail – General Ritchie’s Eighth Army was then defeated by Rommel and driven back from Tobruk to El Alamein.

The author assesses the performance not only of Ritchie, but of figures such as Auhinleck, Messervy, Norrie, Gott and Others: analysing the British failure at that stage, to gain the upper hand, he concludes that ‘there was no lack of intention and will’’ the tropuble was that it soon became dissipated as it descended the channel of command, partly, but not entirely, because the machine was not capable of providing the results demanded of it’.

Lord Carver’s compelling story is remarkable for its detailed narrative of the events, taking into account not only the operational conditions of tank warfare, but also later, often contradictory, published accounts. His portrayal of General Ritchie and his fellow commanders, and of their efforts to get results – principally the defeat of Rommel – from the ‘machine’ at their disposal, will be of absorbing interest to military historians, and to those with personal recollections of the North African Campaign.